Lyce · Hybrid Watch
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Coordinated cyberattacks strike Polish energy infrastructure during winter.
The Polish Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT Polska) and government officials disclosed that on 29 December 2025, a large-scale cyberattack targeted at least 30 renewable energy installations, a significant industrial manufacturer, and a regional combined heat and power plant — infrastructure central to Poland’s energy and heating supply during the winter season. The operation involved deployment of destructive malware designed to corrupt or erase data and disrupt supervisory control systems rather than merely extract information, reflecting a sabotage-oriented intent rather than conventional espionage. Polish authorities publicly attributed the attacks to a team linked to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) — specifically hacker groups tracked under names such as Berserk Bear and Dragonfly — noting that malware overlaps and tactics aligned with known Russian intelligence-linked operations. Independent cybersecurity researchers from companies like ESET further linked elements of the malware to the Russian military intelligence cyber unit Sandworm, based on code similarities with past destructive operations, suggesting potential coordination or shared toolkits among Russian state-aligned actors. Although defensive systems prevented a complete blackout or collapse of grid operations, the attack significantly disrupted communications and data flows between renewable installations and distribution networks, forcing emergency procedures and manual intervention.
E/M/R/S scores
- EExistence0/4 · Not assessed
- MIntent0/4 · Not assessed
- RRussian actor link0/4 · Not assessed
- SRussian state responsibility0/4 · Not assessed
Facts
No facts
Sources
-
- Role
- discovery_lead
- Date
- 2025-12-29T18:32:26Z
The Polish Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT Polska) and government officials disclosed that on 29 December 2025, a large-scale cyberattack targeted at least 30 renewable energy installations, a significant industrial manufacturer, and a regional combined heat and power plant — infrastructure central to Poland’s energy and heating supply during the winter season. The operation involved deployment of destructive malware designed to corrupt or erase data and disrupt supervisory control systems rather than merely extract information, reflecting a sabotage-oriented intent rather than conventional espionage. Polish authorities publicly attributed the attacks to a team linked to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) — specifically hacker groups tracked under names such as Berserk Bear and Dragonfly — noting that malware overlaps and tactics aligned with known Russian intelligence-linked operations. Independent cybersecurity researchers from companies like ESET further linked elements of the malware to the Russian military intelligence cyber unit Sandworm, based on code similarities with past destructive operations, suggesting potential coordination or shared toolkits among Russian state-aligned actors. Although defensive systems prevented a complete blackout or collapse of grid operations, the attack significantly disrupted communications and data flows between renewable installations and distribution networks, forcing emergency procedures and manual intervention.