Lyce · Hybrid Watch
hw_4db4a949fab93026
Sharp increase in GPS-/GNSS disturbances recorded in Latvian airspace.
In the first three months of 2025, Latvia recorded 290 instances of GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) interference within its airspace — an increase of around 55 % compared to the same period in the previous year. The disruption spans national skies and, although flight safety remained intact (pilots switched to alternate systems), it exposed significant vulnerability in air-navigation integrity. Latvia’s position along the Baltic corridor makes it susceptible to jamming signals originating from neighbouring Russian territory or proximate maritime zones. By targeting the navigation layer rather than performing a overt strike, the actor increases complexity for civil-aviation authorities, forces investment in backup systems and disrupts the sense of security in national airspace. Latvian aviation representatives flagged that some of the interference aligns with broader Baltic-Sea GPS-jamming patterns traced to Russian sources. The incident underscores that Latvia’s defence concerns extend into electronic-navigation domains and that hybrid operations may target civilian transport infrastructure to exert strategic pressure.
E/M/R/S scores
- EExistence0/4 · Not assessed
- MIntent0/4 · Not assessed
- RRussian actor link0/4 · Not assessed
- SRussian state responsibility0/4 · Not assessed
Facts
No facts
Sources
-
- Role
- discovery_lead
- Date
- 2025-04-06T22:00:00Z
In the first three months of 2025, Latvia recorded 290 instances of GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) interference within its airspace — an increase of around 55 % compared to the same period in the previous year. The disruption spans national skies and, although flight safety remained intact (pilots switched to alternate systems), it exposed significant vulnerability in air-navigation integrity. Latvia’s position along the Baltic corridor makes it susceptible to jamming signals originating from neighbouring Russian territory or proximate maritime zones. By targeting the navigation layer rather than performing a overt strike, the actor increases complexity for civil-aviation authorities, forces investment in backup systems and disrupts the sense of security in national airspace. Latvian aviation representatives flagged that some of the interference aligns with broader Baltic-Sea GPS-jamming patterns traced to Russian sources. The incident underscores that Latvia’s defence concerns extend into electronic-navigation domains and that hybrid operations may target civilian transport infrastructure to exert strategic pressure.