Lyce · Hybrid Watch
hw_2b1c11e4dfae7b5d
DDoS campaign by pro-Russia hacktivists hits Austrian government and infrastructure websites.
In late September 2024, cyber-security firm Radware reported that over 40 Austrian organisations—covering government portals, airports, financial service providers and even a stock exchange—were targeted by a distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) campaign claimed by the hacktivist groups NoName057(16) and OverFlame, both aligned with pro-Russia narratives. Attackers publicly declared their motives in Telegram channels, stating the campaign started as Austria approached its national election on 29 September. Websites of mainstream Austrian political parties (the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and Social Democratic Party (SPÖ)) reported outage statuses, at one point noting the site was “temporarily unavailable due to attacks.” Although no long-term system damage was publicly reported, the campaign disrupted access, caused delays and generated alarm about the resilience of critical online infrastructure. Austria’s capital and national infrastructure (rather than border zones), demonstrating that even states not front-line in conventional kinetic war are targets of hybrid operations. The dynamics illustrate how non-kinetic, digital coercion aligns with broader hybrid-warfare patterns: using denial-of-service attacks timed with elections to create uncertainty, raise cost and influence domestic environments.
E/M/R/S scores
- EExistence0/4 · Not assessed
- MIntent0/4 · Not assessed
- RRussian actor link0/4 · Not assessed
- SRussian state responsibility0/4 · Not assessed
Facts
No facts
Sources
-
- Role
- discovery_lead
- Date
- 2024-09-23T22:00:00Z
In late September 2024, cyber-security firm Radware reported that over 40 Austrian organisations—covering government portals, airports, financial service providers and even a stock exchange—were targeted by a distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) campaign claimed by the hacktivist groups NoName057(16) and OverFlame, both aligned with pro-Russia narratives. Attackers publicly declared their motives in Telegram channels, stating the campaign started as Austria approached its national election on 29 September. Websites of mainstream Austrian political parties (the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and Social Democratic Party (SPÖ)) reported outage statuses, at one point noting the site was “temporarily unavailable due to attacks.” Although no long-term system damage was publicly reported, the campaign disrupted access, caused delays and generated alarm about the resilience of critical online infrastructure. Austria’s capital and national infrastructure (rather than border zones), demonstrating that even states not front-line in conventional kinetic war are targets of hybrid operations. The dynamics illustrate how non-kinetic, digital coercion aligns with broader hybrid-warfare patterns: using denial-of-service attacks timed with elections to create uncertainty, raise cost and influence domestic environments.